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2Charles Pigott*
The last decade has seen a worldwide process of
financial refonn and innovation that has greatly
altered the financial structures of many nations.
These changes can be traced in large part to a
common set of economic afflictions-inflation,
higher oil prices, and sluggish real growth. By
altering financial flows and upsetting the competi-
tive relations among financial institutions, they
have greatly strained the financial systems. In the
process, policies regulating financial institutions
and markets have been undercut and uncertainties
attending the effects of traditional monetary and
fiscal policies have increased.
No country has experienced more far-reaching
financial change over the last decade than Japan.
Japan began the 1970s with a highly regulated and
fairly rigid financial system that contrasted sharply
with its sophisticated and comparatively unregu-
lated real economy. Although limited steps toward
liberalization were taken during the 1960s, the in-
flation and oil shocks of 1973-1974 drastically
accelerated the pace of change. By altering eco-
nomic circumstances,the two forces created a need
for a more flexible financial system, one in which
market forces could playagreater role in allocating
credit. In response to this need, Japanese authorities
considerably relaxed controls on interest rates and
financial flows in recent years. The process of
refonn and its ultimate effects, however, are far
from complete.
This paper describes the progress of financial
refonn in Japan since the early 1970s. The follow-
ing section traces the evolution ofJapan's financial
system during this period, comparing and contrast-
ing the process there with that in the United States.
The focus is on how the economic shocks experi-
enced by Japan have greatly increased its econ-
omy's need for the functions served by a free finan-
cial system (one in which prices and financial flows
are detennined by market forces). SectionII briefly
reviews the major refonns that have occurred in
response to these pressures and their main effects.
As we will see, the flexibility ofshort-tenn interest
rates and the mobility ofcapital between Japan and
other countries has increased substantially while
regulation in some other areas continues to be near-
ly as restrictive as before.
I. Economic Forces for Reform
At the beginning ofthe 1970s, both the U.S. and
Japan possessed highly developed free market
economies. Yet their financial systems were very
different with that of the U.S. by far the more
sophisticated ofthe two. The differences were less
the product of contrasting historical experiences
and real economic structures than of the much
greater government intervention in the financial
system in Japan than in the U.S. Still, the inflation,
oil, and other major shocks of the seventies com-
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bined to serve as the" engine" forfinancial changes
in both countries. These changes have generally
weakened regulatory constraints in both countries,
and nudged Japan's financial system closer to that
ofthe U.S.
TheWayWe Were
The financial system of the United States has
long been among the most highly developed in the
world. Its sophistication is reflected in the wide
variety of financial instruments available to bor-
rowers and lenders, as well as the high degree of
specialization and competition in the provision of
financial services. Particularly notable are the ex-tensive and highly developed financial markets
(markets for short-term securities such as Treasury
bills and commercial paper and the long-term capi-
tal markets) all of which are accessible to a wide
range offinancial and non-financial entities. These
markets allow funds to flow directly from lenders to
borrowers, rather than indirectly through financial
intermediaries, to a greater degree than in most
other nations.
The sophistication of the U.S. financial system
derives in large part from the relatively "laissez-
faire" approach to financial regulation taken by
U.S. authorities. Most interest rates, for example,
have been left to vary with market forces. Authori-
ties here have used controls or other administrative
devices to influence the allocation ofcredit sparing-
ly when compared to othercountries. Most remark-
ably, since the 1950s, the U.S. has maintained very
few legal impediments to financial flows between
here and abroad, while allowing foreign institutions
to compete in the domestic financial arena on a
nearly equal footing with our own residents. The
result, with some notable exceptions, has been a
comparatively liberal regulatory environment in
which market forces, rather than legal or adminis-
trative controls, usually determine the allocation
ofcredit.
Still, regulations have substantially affected
credit flows and competitive relations in certain
areas. Legal ceilings on deposit interest rates, re-
strictions on the asset choices of thrifts, and the
partially subsidized lending ofseveral govemment-
sponsored financial institutions have aimed at aug-
menting the supply offunds to housing. Other gov-
ernment agencies and programs have attempted to
channel funds to agriculture and small business.
Limitations on branching have so severely restricted
geographic competition among banks and thrifts
that the U.S. has thousands of depository insti-
tutions, compared to the dozens generally found
abroad.
Restrictions on the financial activitiesofbanks-
most notably theirexclusion from investment bank-
ing-have limited their ability to compete with
non-bank financial institutions. In addition to these
regulations are numerous restrictions on financial
institutions' capital, exposure to individual borrow-
ers, and choice offinancial instruments and finan-
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cial activities applied (at least originally) for pru-
dential reasons. Again, though, U.S. regulation,
taken as a whole, has been less restrictive than that
usually found abroad. I Indeed, as we will see, many
regulations that have been applied have become a
major focus of financial change in large part
because our financial system has been so free in
most other respects.
In stark contrast, Japan's financial system has
long been permeated by government regulation,
formal and informal (see the thumbnail sketch of
this system). To a certain extent, present-day regu-
latory policy reflects practices inherited from the
development ofJapan's modern financial system in
the late 19th century. They include the separation of
short- from longer-term finance, the segregation of
financial institutions by function and sector served,
and the "state-guidance" of financial activities.
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But perhaps the major motivation ofpost-war gov-
ernment intervention in the financial system has
been to influence the allocation and costofcredit to
various sectors, with the most important aim to
encourage business investment by channelling
household savings to the corporate sector.
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Japan's authorities have sought to influence fi-
nancial flows both directly and indirectly. Govern-
ment financial intermediaries, which serve mainly
small business, utilities, agriculture, and foreign
trade, playa much greater role in the allocation of
creditin Japan than in the U.S. (see Table 1). Policy
has also affected credit flows more indirectly, al-
though probably even more pervasively, by severe-
ly limiting the flexibility ofinterest rates, restricting
access to financial markets, and limiting the asset
and liability choices of financial and non-financial
entities.
Until the late 1970s, essentially all key Japanese
interest rates were constrained to varying degrees
by some form ofgovernment action.
4 Deposit inter-
estrates were set at artificially low levels in compar-
ison with yields on otherassets (in partto keep bank
loan rates down by limiting the cost oftheir funds)
and varied only sporadically. Policy seriously lim-
ited the flexibility of banks' and other financial
institutions' lending rates by tying them to the cen-
tral bankdiscount rate. Moreover, governmentcon-
trols over rate-setting even extended to the capital
markets where rates on newly-issued bonds weregenerally kept below secondary market yields.
Even in the short-term money markets (the call,
bill, and bond-repurchase markets), usually spared
explicitinterest rate controls, government participa-
tion in the rate-setting process and outright market
intervention often limited rate variations indirectly
(more on this in Section II).5
Policy restrictions on the array offinancial instru-
ments available to individuals and institutions, and
limitations on access to the financial markets,
served to enforce the interest rate controlsby limit-
ing substitutions among assets and by channelling
funds in desired directions. Banks, for example,
have traditionally been unable to "purchase" funds
from the non-bank public by issuing negotiable
certificates of deposit, debentures, or analogous
instruments (practices common in the U.S. since
the 1960s). They have had to fund their lending
through deposits (with their artificially low interest
rates) and borrowings from the Bank of Japan.
Other financial institutions have been allowed to
raise funds by issuingdebentures (at rates tied to the
discount rate), but they have been prohibited from
deposit-taking.
Limitations on the positions offinancial institu-
tions in the bond-repurchase (Gensaki) market, and
the exclusionofnon-financial corporations from the
call and bill markets, have impeded arbitrage
among the money markets. Non-financial business
has had to rely mainly on bank loans and internal
funds to finance investment because regulation has
discouraged bond finance and effectively prohib-
ited commercial paperissues.
6 Services provided by
financial institutions have also been restricted by
policy as, for example, banks have until recently
been prohibited from acting as underwriters or
dealers in securities markets.
Table 1
Financial 'Profile' ofJapan and U.S.
1. Gross Savings as Fraction ofGNP
2. Fraction ofFunds Raised 'Directly' in Domestic Securities I
Markets by Domestic Non-Financial Sectors




















4. Share ofTotal Assets ofFinancial Institutions held by:
a. Commercial Banks NA 32.3 NA 34.9
b. OtherPrivate Financial Institutions NA 56.3 NA 37.6
c. Government Financiallnstitutions NA 7.6 NA 23.3
5. Share ofFunds Raised by Corporate Business Via:
2
a.LoansfromBanks 21.1 25.1 58.0 41.7
b. Loans from other Private Financial Institutions 35.5 21.6 32.7 44.2
c. Bond Issue3 22.9 33.0 1.9 5.0
d. Equity 20.3 20.3 7.3 9.2
Sources: (I) OECD NationalIncome AccountStatistics.
(2) Country sources on flow of funds statistics.
(3) OECD Financial Statistics.
(4) OECD Financial Statistics.
(5) "FlowofFunds ofthe Japanese Economy," various years forJapan; and OECD Financial Statistics for U.S.
Note: I. Figures refer to the fraction oftotal funds raised by domestic non-financial sectors that were supplied directly in domestic
financial markets (figures for U.S. also include funds supplied by foreign sector).
2. Funds raised (or 'financial sources') exclude all trade credit for the U.S., and foreign trade credits received by government
for Japan.
3. Forthe U.S., figures inciude short-term securities issued by corporations.
27Mostrestrictiveofall were regulations governing
financial relations between Japan and other coun-
tries. Virtually all financial flows into and out ofthe
country were subject to ceilings, prior approval, or
otherlimitations. The financial activities ofJapan's
banksabroadwerecloselysupervisedand occasion-
ally curtailed by the authorities. Foreign institu-
tions' access to Japan's financial system was very
restricted, although not only by overt discrimina-
tion. In particular, the restrictions applied to all
banks (although not equally) on branching and con-
versions of foreign currency into yen worked a
particular hardship on foreign banks, who, because
of their relatively late entry into Japan's market,
have had more limited sources of yen funds than
their Japanese competitors.
7 Foreigners were gen-
erallydenied access to the bond and equity markets,
whether as borrowers, lenders, ordealers.
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Not surprisingly, regulatory policy has given the
Japanese system several distinctive characteristics.
Policy has tended to assign each type of financial
institution its own particular funding base and to
circumscribe its lending sphere. As a result, the
activities ofdifferent types offinancial institutions
generally overlap less than they do in the U.S.
Regulation has also circumscribed the financial out-
lets available to non-financial sectors, particularly
to the household sector where mortgage credit has
been very scarce and consumer credit virtually un-
available.
9
Interestrate controls, togetherwith limitations on
asset/liability choices, have severely stunted the
developmentofJapan's money andcapital markets.
In fact, virtually all external funds raised by house-
holds and businesses in Japan have been obtained
"indirectly" through financial intermediaries.
Typically, less than ten percent of funds raised
domestically in Japan flow directly between surplus
and deficit sectors via the financial markets, com-
pared to about thirty percent in the U.S. (Table 1).
The variety ofmaturities, denominations, and other
features of financial instruments in Japan is also
much more limited than here. Furthemore, by often
preventing interest rates from moving to their mar-
ket-clearing levels, controls have led to widespread
relianceby financial institutionson quotas and other
"credit-rationing" devices. Partly as a result, rela-
tions between individual banks and their corporate
clients tend to be stronger and more personalized in
28
Japanthan is generally the case in the United States.
Finally, these effects of regulation have influ-
enced the transmission of monetary and fiscal
policy-actions to the private economy. Until very
recently, monetary actions to smooth fluctuations in
economic activity relied on corporations' depen-
dence on bank lending, and banks' dependence on
Bank ofJapan credit, for theireffect. Forexample,
to .slow real activity, the central bank would reduce
its credit to private banks to force them to curtail
their lending to business. The resulting squeeze on
corporate liquidity usually ledto apromptreduction
in business investment.
1O Thus, the short-run tim-
ing, force, and incidence of monetary restraint de-
pended more on administrative restrictions of the
quantity ofcredit than on regulating its cost. As we
will soon see, governmentdebt management policy
also has been profoundly affected by regulation-
induced limitations on the financial markets.
WindsofChange
Financial change in Japan and the U.S. can hard-
ly be said to have begun with the 1970s. Japan had
taken steps to increase interestrate flexibility during
the 1960s, for example. And in both countries there
has been long-standing dissatisfaction with the dis-
tortions brought by regulation and considerable
support for reform within as well as outside govern-
ment. At the beginning of the 1970s, economic
considerations and political forces opposing change
were in rough balance with pressures for change.
During the next decade, several worldwide eco-
nomic upheavals upset the equilibrium and dramat-
ically accelerated financial reform and innovation
in Japan, the U.S., and many other nations. Devel-
opments such as the surge in world inflation begin-
ning in the early 1970s, the slowing ofreal growth
and shifts in industrial structure resulting in part
from the oil price increases, and the breakdown of
fixed exchange rates over 1971-1973 fundamental-
ly altered the costs and benefits ofexisting regula-
tory policy, rendering much ofit obsolete. Still, the
ultimate effects of these forces have been condi-
tioned by institutional circumstances, so that the
resulting processes offinancial change have varied
considerably among countries.
In the U.S. probably the most important factor
shaping financial change over the last ten years has
been our inflation. Inflation, by widening the gapbetween real returns on regulated deposits and mar-
ket yields, helped spur the growth ofmoney market
funds, NOW accounts and other substitutes for tra-
ditional demand accounts, greatly increasing pres-
sures for interest rate deregulation. Inflation con-
tributed substantiallytothethrift industry's woes by
raising the cost of its funds above yields on the
long-term mortgage assets to which regulation
largely confined them. The burden ofcommercial
banks' required reserves increased with inflation,
spurring an exodus from Federal Reserve member-
ship and prompting Congress, in 1980, to extend
reserve requirements to all depository institutions.
These developments, in tum, have altered competi-
tive relations among financial institutions, general-
ly to the detriment ofbanks and (especially) thrifts,
causing them to seek opportunities outside their
traditional spheres. One result has been intensified
pressures to allow banks greater involvement in the
securities business and to relax restrictions on inter-
state banking.
The pervasive impactofinflation, and the way in
which it has fostered financial innovation, owe
much to the comparative freedom oftheV.S. finan-
cial system. Regulation has long rested on a some-
what precarious foundation, given the wide variety
ofunregulated substitutes for regulated instruments
and activities. Once inflation made such substitu-
tions worthwhile, the process of financial change
became virtually irresistible. That these changes
occurred spontaneously in the private sector, largely
outside the control (and often despite the efforts) of
authorities, is a further indication of the latitude
enjoyed by the private financial system in the V.S.
As we will now see, financial change in Japan's
more controlled system proceeded along a very
different path.
Japan's Path
In Japan, policies and institutions tailored to the
conditions of the 1950s and 1960s did not work
nearly as well in the very different economic envi-
ronment of the last decade. This experience led to
financial reforms aimed at liberalizing interest rates
andfinancial flows. But, in contrast to the V.S., the
resulting financial changes have largely been di-
rected, indeed imposed, by the authorities mainly
because regulatory policy has allowed very little
scope for spontaneous innovation in the private
29
sector.
Inflation's role in this process was importantbut
not nearly as central as it was here. Bydramatically
lowering many real interest rates and greatly in-
creasing their variability, the surge in inflation in
the mid-1970s increased consumer dissatisfaction
with regulated deposit rates and demonstrated to
officials thatcontrols on nominal interestrates were
apt to add to the volatility ofreal rates. But because
Japan's inflation was comparatively short-lived
(lasting mainly from 1973 to 1976) and financial
choices were so circumscribed, inflation did not
disrupt financial flows and competitive relations to
nearly the degree seen in the V.S.
II Moreover, fi-
nancial reform in Japan extended to areas not as
obviously related to inflation, such as the liberali-
zation ofcontrols on international capital flows.
The more fundament~l pressures for financial
change in Japan have come from two basic eco-
nomic changes over the last decade: (1) changes in
the financing needs of various sectors ofthe econ-
omy resulting (mainly) from the slowing of real
growth and shifts in industrial structure, and (2) the
breakdown offixed exchange rates over the period
1971-1973.
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The slowing ofreal growth in Japan has sharply
altered traditional financing patterns both directly
and indirectly. Slower growth greatly reduced the
business investment rate, making corporations less
dependent on bank loans. Japan's household sav-
ings (which have remained very high in relation to
income) no longer flow to business to the same
degree as before. Instead, a much larger fraction
now goes to the government sector as fiscal mea-
sures to spur growth have increased the public
sector budget deficit to 4-6 percent ofGNP from
the 1-2 percent average during the early 1970s.
Japan's savings have also flowed abroad via the
large current account surplus incurred over the
period 1976-1978 and in 1981.
The pattern offinancial flows among individual
industries has also been altered as production has
shifted away from heavy industries suchas steel and
ship-building toward autos, chemicals and the
emerging high-technology semi-conductor and
computer industries. Moreover, financing patterns
have not only changed considerably, they have
often become more variable (and probably less pre-
dictable) than before, as illustratedby the swings inChart 1
1980 1978
greatly increased need for these functions explains
why financial reform has generally resulted in liber-









In any economy as diverse as Japan's, informa-
tion aboutfinancial needs andopportunities is apt to
be widely dispersed among individuals. Anyone
particular entity can be knowledgeable about its
own requirements, but it cannot be perfectly
informed about the needs of others. This is one
problem any financial system faces: how to "pool"
dispersed information to allocate credit to its most
productive uses.
The credit allocation process in Japan has been
centralized by ourstandards. It has relied heavily on
the decisions ofgovernment authorities and officials
at the private lending institutions. The success with
which these officials gathered the information
required to determine the economy's needs deter-
mined the efficiency with which funds were
allocated.
Indeed, the presumption underlying the tradi-
tional regulatory approach was that responsible
officials were knowledgeable and skillful enoughto
direct funds to their most productive outlets. This
presumption is not valid (if it ever was) under the
changing economic conditions now facing Japan.
Officials in government and private lending institu-
tions can hardly be expected to have acquired the
detailed k!lowledge now needed to allocate savings
-10
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the financial deficits of the corporate and foreign
sectors depicted inChart I.
Financial liberalizationin Japan has also received
a powerful impetus from a momentous change in
the international financial system: the switch from
fixed to flexible exchange rates during the 1971-
1973 period. This change reflects the much greater
divergence in nations' macroeconomic policies
(particularly toward inflation) overthe lastten years
comparedto the precedingtwo decades. As aresult,
direct controls on certain financial prices critical to
Japan's economy (exchange rates) were no longer
practical. Consequently, Japanese authorities must
now be concerned that actual exchange rates reflect
their equilibrium levels and that exchange rate vol-
atility from temporary factors be minimized.
By altering financial flows and incentives, both
changes have made enforcement of traditional re-
strictions more problematic while, at the same time,
rendering them less effective in accomplishing their
original aims. For example, as corporate depen-
dence on bank loans has fallen, the authorities can
no longer be confident that simply restricting bank
credit will have the prompt, predictable impact on
economic activity it had in the past. Moreand more,
the short-run transmission of monetary policy ac-
tions has to rely onaffecting the costofcreditto the
private sector, necessitating greaterflexibility in (at
least) shorter-term interest rates. Likewise, the in-
creaseddiversity in policy underfloating rates prob-
ably increased pressures for international capital
flows. (In the previous fixed-rate regime, countries
had to pursue compatible inflation policies, at least
in the long-run.) For this reason, effective capital
controls are apt to be more costly to maintain be-
cause the incentives to evade them, and the distor-
tions arising from them, are probably greater.
More important, these changes have substantially
increased Japan's need for certain abilities possessed
by a free financial system, abilities sorely missing
from the rigidlycontrolled systemofthe past. These
include the abilities to pool information from dis-
parate sources to achieve an efficient allocation of
savings; to provide a wide variety of financial
instruments with maturity, liquidity, and otherchar-
acteristics suitable to the diverse (and variable)
needs of borrowers and lenders; and to provide
financing to ease the adjustment to changing finan-
cial surpluses and deficits ofvarious sectors. Japa11's
30efficiently, norcan they plausibly knowthe''right"
exchange rate, since its value is determined by a
variety offactors often not directly observable even
after theiroccurrence.
Pooling information for the efficient allocationof
funds is a task to which free financial markets are
particularly well-suited. In such a system, prices
serve to informall parties aboutfinancing needs and
availability. The subsequent allocation of funds
therefore depends upon the circumstances of and
information available to both borrowers and lenders.
Moreover, lenders do not bave to possess detailed
knowledge about where funds can be most effec-
tively employed. Thepricethat individual borrowers
are willing to pay, based on their assessmentofhow
productively they can use the funds, effectively
communicates this information. In this way, free
financial markets can effectively use considerably
more information than is available to any single
participant, or group ofparticipants, and are there-
fore apt to be much more efficient in allocating
funds in a changing economy.
Reaping the benefits of free financial markets,
however, requires a shift in the emphasis ofregula-
tory policy. As long as authorities relied on their
own knowledge offinancial prices and direct credit
flows, they had an incentive to restrict access to the
markets in order to minimize the resources and
effort involved in regulation. But ifthe knowledge
possessed by diverse households and businesses is
to be used, those actors must be allowed to buy and
sell freely, and prices must be aiiowed to vary to
reflect their knowledge. Thus, liberalization of in-
ternational and domestic financial flows, and of
interest rates, has become more necessary.
ProvisionofFinancial Instruments
Another task of a financial system is to provide
financial instruments with the maturity, liquidity,
risk and other characteristics needed by borrowers
and lenders. The mix of instruments required de-
pends greatly on the pattern of financial flows as,
for example, the more funds flowing to housing, the
greaterthe need for mortgage and similarsecurities.
Japan's system has traditionally met such needs by
providing a strictly limited array of instruments
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tailored to the needs ansmg from a particular
financial-flow pattern. But, as shifts in financial
flows have altered these requirements, they have
also underscored the need for more flexible finan-
cial markets and institutions that can accommodate
widely varying types ofassets and liabilities.
The burgeoning government debt resulting from
the large budget deficits incurred in recent years
illustrates this process well (Table 2). Largely
because Japan lacked a short-term market for gov-
ernment debt, it has financed the deficits with long-
term government bonds of very limited (original)
maturities. 13 Yet private entities have been reluctant
to acquire large quantities of such debt, partly be-
cause the underdeveloped state of the bond and
other financial markets severely limits its market-
ability and, hence, its liquidity. This dilemma has
led the government to allocate its debt among the
financial institutions at rates generally below those
prevailing on the secondary markets. Until 1977,
the institutions' ability to sell this debt (on the
secondary market or "over-the-counter") was also
quite limited. Not surprisingly, the liquidity, and the
profits, offinancial institutions, particularly banks,
have suffered significantly from this policy.14 In-
deed, the absorption ofthe debt has become, per-
haps, a greater problem for Japan's economy than
the real demands onJapan'ssavingsoffinancing the
deficits. 15
Almost certainly this burden would have been
considerably less in a free financial system with
well-developed secondary markets and other facili-
ties capable ofmaking even very long-term instru-
ments relatively liquid. Japan's past(and, to a lesser
extent, its current) policies have largely prevented
such outlets from developing. For this reason, the
large overhang ofgovernment debt is likely to goad
further financial reform in coming years. 16
And Adjustment
Finally, afinancial systemmust also serve toease
the cost ofadjustment to changes in financial defi-
cits and surpluses. Any sectorthat develops such an
imbalance must eitherfinance it ormakereal adjust-
ments in spending and/or income to eliminate it.
Both adjustments are usually costly. Financial facil-3233ities can reduct this cost, eitherby stretching outthe
adjustment or by making it unnecessary when the
imbalance is temporary. Again Japan's regulated
system could meet traditional needs, but it has
proved less capable in promoting smooth adjust-
ment to the shifts in deficits and surpluses seen in
recent years. 17
This limitation probably was a majorfactor spur-
ring the liberalization of controls on international
capital flows in 1978. As indicated earlier, the
balance between domestic savings and investment
(and government) demand has fluctuated consider-
ably in recent years, producing large swings in the
current account balance. To the extent that capital
controls have impeded the financing ofthese imbal-
ances, adjustments have been forced onto exports,
imports, and exchange rates. Forexample, ifJapan
were to be unable to fully finance its current account
deficit, it would have to increase exports, reduce
imports, or allow the exchange rate to depreciate
(or, more likely, some combination of all three).
Besides adding to exchange rate volatility, such
adjustments could have very disruptive impacts on
wages and prices, aggregate demand, and resource
allocation in Japan (not to mention her trading
partners). 18
Reprise
Financial changes in the U.S. and Japan overthe
last ten years largelyreflecttensionscreatedby their
traditional regulatory approaches. Similar econo-
mic events have sharply heightened these tensions,
but as the two countries' policies have differed
greatly, so have their processes offinancial reform.
In the U.S., stringent regulation ofthe sort common
in Japan has been more the exception than the rule.
Consequently, financial change has largely origin-
ated in spontaneous innovations in the private sector
that subsequently spurred, often belated, regulatory
reforms. Japan applied regulation throughout the
financial system to "custom-fit" its capabilities to
the economiccircumstances ofthe 1950s and 1960s.
In the process it severely limited its adaptability.
This is the main reason that financial change there
appears to bemore far-reaching, and more underthe
control ofauthorities, than that in the U.S. Indeed,
as we will now see, as far as financial reform in
Japan has already gone, many ofits most important























10.8 Total as Fraction ofGNP (%)
Maturity:2
Medium and Long Term (%)
ShortTerm (%)





Public Financial Institutions f
Fraction ofTotal Assets
Central Bank 21.0 52.5 70.6
Private Banks 2.4 5.9 8.6
OtherPrivate Institutions L3 1.5 6.1
Notes: I. Figures refer to the debt of the central government only, and exclude debt issues of public corporations, public financial
institutions, and local authorities. Data refer tofiscal year (ending March).
2. Most debt held by the BankofJapan is short-term; most debt held by banksand otherprivate financial institutions, as well as
the public, is medium or longerterm. Maximum maturity on government debt is 10 years.
Source: Bank ofJapan, EconomicStatisticsAnnual.
34III. Japan's Reforms and their Effects
Financial changes in Japan, as in the U.S., over
the last decade have concentrated in areas ofgreat-
est tension between changing economic conditions
and regulatory structures. During this period, re-
forms have significantly increased the flexibility of
interest rates and improved access to and variety in
financial markets in certain areas.
The main changes and theirmost apparenteffects
on financial prices and flows, as well as those areas
that reform has yet to touch, are described below. It
should be noted though that both regulation and
reform in Japan are generally more implicit and
informal than here. As is often observed, the U.S. is
a much more legalistic society than Japan. Changes
in regulatory policy here come as the result oflegis-
lation, orexplicitly announced changes in adminis-
trative rules. Futhermore, actions not explicitly
forbidden by regulation are nearly always presumed
to be allowed. In Japan, regulation is less formal,
and less codified. Until recently, many actions of
privateentities were presumed to be forbidden unless
explicitly authorized. As a result, significant
changes in regulatory policy have at times come
from shifts in the application ofexisting rules rather
than their explicit changes. Explicit changes in
policy have often served, in part, to ratify changes
that have already occurred informally. For this rea-
son, it is not always easy to determine precisely
when a given change in Japanese regulatory policy
occurred.
Interest RateLiberalization
Regulation, tradit.ionally, has had three charac-
teristic effects on Japanese interest rates. First, some
rates have been kept considerably below those that
would have prevailed in free markets. Second, the
variability of real interest rates has probably
been increased by constraints on the flexibility of
nominal interest rates, because those constraints
could have prevented nominal yields from adjusting
to shifts in expected inflation. Finally, regulation
has tended to segmentfinancial markets; as aresult,
yields on very similar instruments have often di-
verged sharply during periods of tight money.
Changes in these three patterns over time provide
indirect indications ofthe progress ofreform.
Two sets of reforms adopted during the 1970s
35
have noticeably modified these patterns. First, in
1970 the authorities began to link most explicitly
regulated interest rates (except the money market
rates) to the central bank discount rate, although to
varying degrees.
J9 Prior to 1970, those rates varied
little. Since then, bank lending rates, as well as
long-term lending rates and yields on newly issued
bonds and debentures, have moved roughly in pro-
portion to variations in the discount rate (except
during the 1973-74 and 1979-80 "tight" money
periods). Deposit rates have also varied more than
before this change, although by considerably less
than lending rates (see Chart 2-C). Because the
discountrate has fluctuated more overthe last decade
than during the 1960s, the effect has been to increase
the variabilityofnominal regulatedrates linked to it.
Second, in 1978 and 1979, interest rates in the
traditional money markets were, in effect, com-
pletely deregulated. Japan largely ended official
participation in the setting ofcall rates, restrictions
on the resale ofcommercial bills and limitations on
financial institutions' access to the Gensaki market.
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The last two moves linked the money markets more
closely, and sharply reduced the large spreads among
money market yields that used to emerge during
periods of tight money. For example, during the
money slowdown of 1973-1974, the Gensaki rate
rose considerably above the call and billyields (see
Chart 2-B). This suggests that the restrictions on
call/bill rate flexibility were especially binding dur-
ing tight-money periods and that substitution
between these markets and the Gensaki market was
effectively limited. Since 1978, money market yields
have remained much closer together, even through
the slowing of money growth in 1979-1980
21
, pro-
viding tangible evidence of the liberalization of
these markets.
Howfar have these reforms gone in givingJapan-
ese interest rates the flexibility they would have in a
completely free market? While the variability of
nominal rates has been substantiallygreateroverthe
last decade than before, the variability of several
fundamental determinants of interest rates-infla-
tion and real income-has also risen (see Table 3).
Whether actual interest rates now reflect their
equilibrium values to a substantially greater degree
than before is thus not immediately obvious.-4 ..............-........._ ................
Notes: I. Inflation rate is calculated as the percentage change
overthe same quarter ofthe previous year.
2. The Gensaki (bond-repurchase) rate for 1973-74 is
estimated from the graph in the September 1981
Asian Monetary Monitor.
3. All data are quarterly averages.
Two othercomparisonsare more suggestive. First,
in a free market, nominal interest rates are apt to be
more variable than their real counterparts because
nominal rates tend to adjust to offset changes in
expected inflation (at least partially); where nominal
rates are controlled, real rates will be more vari-
able.22 Thus the variability of real versus nominal
rates in Japan provides arough gauge ofinterest rate
flexibility. Second, it is useful to compare the vari-
ability ofJapanese rates with that oftheir counter-
parts in the U.S., which (except for deposit rates)
are essentially market-determined.
23 Such compari-
sons are given in Table 3 for three periods: 1968-
1972,1973-1977, and 1978-1981.
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The figures in the table suggest that some con-
straints on the flexibility of the Japanese call rate
existed prior to 1978 (by moral suasion and/or
government intervention in the bill market), butthat
the reforms of 1978-1979 have effectively relaxed
them. The real call rate varied more than the nomin-
al rate over the first two periods, from 1968-1977,
the opposite ofthe pattern consistentlyobservedfor
U.S. short rates (and also for Japan's Gensaki rate,
which traditionally has been closest to being mar-
ket-determined). However since 1978, the variabil-
ity ofthe "real" call rate has fallen markedly, both
absolutely as well as in relation to the nominal rate,
suggesting that it is now essentially a "free-
market" yield.
Similar comparisons point to more substantial
increase in the flexibility of bank lending rates.
Over the earliest period, the (average) nominal
lending rate in Japan was much less variable than its
real element (and less variable than the U.S. prime
rate). The variability of nominal lending rates in
Japan increased sharply during 1973-1977, but the
variance ofthe real rate increased by even more as
inflation surged dramatically during the first two
years, and then fell back nearly as precipitously.
However, since 1978, bank lending rates have fol-
lowed the pattern more nearly characteristic of a
free market, with real rates varying less than their
nominal counterparts. This suggests that these rates
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Finally, these reforms have had much less impact
on the setting of deposit rates and in the bond
markets. Deposit rates have varied more during the
last decade than during the 1960s, but they remain
below rates available to financial and non-financial
institutions in the open markets, and almost certainly
below the level a free-market would set. Indeed,
real deposit rates fell to double-digit negative levels
during the 1973-1974 inflation surge, and theiraver-
age level in the last several years has not differed
greatly from that ofthe 1960s (compare Charts 2-A
and 2-C). Reform has also not significantly altered
the practice ofkeeping yields on newly-issued bonds
(generally) below those on the secondary markets.
As indicated in Chart 3, the average level and vari-
ability of the primary-secondary market yield gap
has not differed greatly since 1978 from that ob-
served previously.
Liberalization in Domestic Financial Markets
As explained in the last section, Japanese regula-
tion has severely limited access to financial markets
as well as the types of instruments available to
them. Authorities used these limitations as a com-
plement to interest rate controls in their efforts to
influence the cost and allocation ofcredit. For this
reason, reform in this areahas also beenmostexten-
sive in the short-term financial markets.
Measures taken during the 1970s have resulted in
the creation oftwo new short-termfinancial markets.
When financial institutions were authorized to trade
in certain commercial, industrial, and trade bills
(generally with 1-3 months maturity) in 1972, the
"Commercial Bills" (or "bill-discount") market
was established.
26 One result has been to give banks
the important secondary-reserve asset they largely
lacked prior to 1972. Not surprisingly the market
grew rapidly, becoming the largest of Japan's
money markets until very recently (Table 4).
In 1979, authorities again responded to banks'
needs. This time the need was for additional fund-
ing sources to absorb government debt. The banks
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Notes: All data are end-of-month:
(I) Three-month rate, available from 1975-1981 only.
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A. Industrial Bonds: New-Issue (Primary)
and Secondary Market Rates
Japan'sFinancial Relations WithAbroad
ThemostrecentphaseofJapan's financial reform
-liberalization ofits financial relations with other
countries-has also had dramatic effects. Most re-
strictions on Japanese entities' borrowing from and
lending to other countries have been lifted, as have
most limitations on their ability to buy and sell
foreign exchange. Furthermore, Japan has signifi-
cantly eased the access offoreign institutions, par-
ticularly banks, to Japan's financial markets.
issues.
31 Still, perhaps becausethe government now
has to rely heavily on the bond-market facilities to
market its owndebt, it continuesto require approval
of each individual issue by private corporations,
and (more important) to set primary market yields
below those on the secondary market. 32
deposit. The growth of this outlet has since been
somewhat constrained by a very high minimum
denomination (about $2 million) for CD's (set to
attract corporate rather than household funds) and
by official ceilings on the amount that individual
banks can issue.27 Still, this market has also grown
rapidly, although it remains smaller than the other
short-term markets. Indeed its development prob-
ably has been an important factor in the recent
decline in importance ofthe bill market.
The banks' difficulties in absorbing government
debt also prompted a majorreform ofJapan's bank-
ing law that took effect in April 1982 (the first such
reform since 1927). In addition to codifying bank
regulations, the new law explicitly authorizes banks
to purchase, sell, and underwrite government secu-
rities under administrative guidance. This step, at
least potentially, constitutes the first significant
change in the division of powers among financial
institutions in Japan since World War II. 28
Changes in othermarkets have been more limited
and more subtle. Asset choices available to house-
holds have improved somewhat, particularly with
the introduction in the early 1970s of a combined
demand-savings facility at banks similar to the
Automatic-Transfer from Savings' (ATS) accounts
now available in the U.S.29 More recently, the gov-
ernment has attempted to improve consumer fi-
nance facilities. It has, for example, encouraged
U. S. finance companies to enter the Japanese
market. Still, household financial choices in Japan
remain very restrictive compared to those long
available here.
Reform also has not greatly altered the formal
restrictions facing private corporations in the bond
markets. While the increase in public-sector debt
greatly expanded the marketfor government bonds,
maturities on this debt were broadened to make it
more attractive to the public. As a result, a genuine
market for short-term government securities is now
developing.
30 This growth has greatly stimulated
the secondary market for government bonds, and,
indirectly and more modestly, that for private bonds
as well. Furthermore, the authorities have accom-
modated corporations' increased demand for bond
finance (due in large part to fluctuations in short-
term interest rates) to a substantial degree as evi-
denced by the significant rise since the early 1970s
in the share oftheirexternal funds raised from bond
38As explained in the last section, these refonns
were intended mainly to facilitate the financing of
Japan's current account imbalances and to improve
the efficiency of foreign exchange markets. Their
effect has been to force the integration ofimportant
segments of Japan's financial system with those
abroad. Ultimately, such integration may prove to
be the most powerful force for further liberalization
in domestic markets.
The development is all the more remarkable in
that refonn of capital controls was hardly an issue
during the 1960s. Over most ofthat period, Japan's
current account imbalances were relatively small,
and nearly all financial transactions with abroad
were closely controlled by the authorities. How-
ever, the growing overvaluation of the yen during
the late 1960s and early 1970s led to large current
account surplusesthateffectively forced the gradual
liberalization of capital controls, particularly those
limiting outflows. To this end, a market for yen-
denominated bonds issued by foreign entities,
called the 'Samurai' market, was opened in 1970.
Still, the effect was more symbolic of changes to
come, since until very recently the market was
restricted to international agencies.
The magnitude offinancial flows between Japan
and abroad increased sharply in the 1970s compared
to the 1960s (Chart 5). The activities of Japanese
banks in the U.S. and other industrial countries,
particularly in the Eurocurrency markets, were al-
lowed to expand dramatically. However, until the
late 1970s, the basic policy of regulating virtually
all capital flows was retained. The policy during
this period might be characterized as the "faucet
approach." During periods ofcurrent account sur-
plus and/or upward pressure on the yen, outflows
were actively encouraged while controls on capital
inflows were tightened; large current account defi-
cits and a declining yen often led to the reverse
ofthis policy. In addition, foreign banks operating
in Japan continued to find their activities severely
curtailed by various restrictions, some plainly
discriminatory. 33
Several factors converged during the late 1970s
to produce more explicit and radical changes in
these policies. First, fluctuations in the current ac-
count between large surpluses and large deficits, as
well as wide variations in the yen, underscored the
need for stable financial links with other countries.
Such links would accommodate the changing finan-
cial flows needed to finance the current account
(and hence preventgyrations inexchangerates), but
a regulatory policy that alternately tightens and
loosens controls on these flows is apt to discourage
such flexibility.
Second, the majorrefonnsofJapan's internation-
Table 4
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the dollar vis-a-vis the yen.
as the law also allows them to reimpose restrictions
if (in their judgment) conditions require them. In-
deed, this "escape clause" has been used during
1982 to relieve pressure on the yen by restricting
capital outflows.
That controls on capital flows have been relaxed
substantially can be seen from Chart 5. Note in
particular that the volume of banking inflows and
outflows, as well as purchases and sales offoreign
securities, increased dramatically after 1979 in both
absolute terms and in relation to exports. 35 (This
pattern also suggests that the 1980 foreign
exchange laws in part ratified earlier liberalizations
in the application ofcapital controls.)
Finally, this period has also seen a virtual end to
overtdiscrimination againstthe operationofforeign
banks in Japan. These banks' access to yen funds
was substantially improved by the opening of the
CD market in 1979, as well as by subsequent in-
al financial relations have been directly related to
the culmination of the current phase of domestic
reform. Unrestricted arbitrage between internation-
al and domestic financial markets could easily lead
to highly volatile and disruptive capital flows as
long as interest rates in the domestic markets (par-
ticularly those to which foreigners are given access)
are prevented from adjusting to market forces. Be-
yond this, authorities have sometimes seen integra-
tionofJapan's financial system with thatabroadas a
means to promote the development ofthe domestic
financial system. Finally, pressures from abroad to
open Japan's domestic product markets to foreign-
ers have been accompanied by demands that dis-
crimination against foreign financial institutions
also cease.
Whatever the reasons, regulatory policy in
Japan's international financial relations has virtual-
ly been reversed since 1978. In 1979, foreigners
were granted access to the Gensaki market as part
of the domestic reforms discussed earlier. In one
stroke, this action effectively linked Japan's
money-markets with those abroad. This is graphic-
ally demonstrated by the gap between the Gensaki
rate and the covered (in the forward market) yield
on 3-month Eurodollar deposits (Chart 4). Since
these instruments have very similar characteristics
(other than the currency they are denominated in),
their yields in dollars should be very close in a free
market. Indeed, this has been the case since mid-
1979. Prior to that time, the gap between the two
rates was often very wide as capital controls effec-
tively prevented the arbitrage between the Gensaki
and foreign markets that would have closed the
gap.34
Controls ofall types ofcapital flows were greatly
liberalized, and in many cases abolished, by a new
foreign exchange law that took effect in December
1980. This law reversed the old principle whereby
transactions were prohibited unless specifically
authorized by the authorities. Now, as in the U.S.,
nearly all financial transactions with abroad are
presumed permitted unless expressly prohibited or
otherwise explicitly regulated. The importance of
such a change is considerably more than technical,
given the considerable delay and cost Japanese ins-
titutions often encounter in obtaining official sanc-
tion for their actions. Still, authorities have not
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creases in theirquotas on foreign currency/yencon-
versions. In addition, foreign banks have been
given access to the Bank of Japan's discount
window, and authorized (at least in principle) to
participate in loans subsidized by Japan's export-
import bank and the Japan Development Agency.
These steps have effectively extended to foreign
banks treatment equal to that of their Japanese
counterparts.
However, equal treatment has not greatly allevi-
ated the main problems faced by foreign banks in
Japan for two reasons. First, the government has
extended "equal treatment" to domestic banks as
well, allowing them to extend foreign currency
loans to domestic corporations, an area that was
previously the preserve of foreign banks. Second,
Japanese regulations have traditionally treated large
and small banks (defined by their share of the do-
mestic market) differently, in part to maintain their
relative market positions. Although the foreign
banks in Japan are among the world's largest, they
are treated as small ormedium-sized banks byJapa-
nese authorities since (because of past limitations
on their activities) their share of the Japanese
market is fairly small.
WhatNext?
While progress toward financial liberalization
has been considerable, albeit uneven and incom-
plete, the reform process in Japan is far from over.
Almost every month brings an announcement of
new liberalizations. Judging from official pro-
nouncements, further reforms in consumer and
mortgage finance, banking, and in Japan's interna-
tional financial relations are planned. For example,
there has been widespread discussion, and much
official interest in "internationalizing" the yen,
that is, in promoting its use in international trade
and finance.
Internationalization is seen (by the authorities) as
desirable, perhaps even necessary, as Japan's finan-
cial system becomes more open to foreign influ-
ences, and as Japanese institutions play an increas-
ingly important role in international financial
markets. 35 Still, few concrete steps have been taken
towardthis goal. The authorities have so farresisted
pressures to establish an international banking zone
in Tokyo, one that would be free ofdeposit rate and
other regulations applying to the domestic activities
41of banks. One reason for this reluctance is that
officials apparently fear such a center could inter-
fere with the conduct ofmonetary and other finan-
cial policies.
This last example illustrates that further reforms
in Japan may well prove more difficult than those
already adopted. The changes described earlier
were spurred by prevailing economic conditions;
those remaining, while important for the long-term
efficiency of Japan's financial system, are less
pressing. Further reforms are also likely to alter
substantially the competitive positions of various
financial institutions, and thereby raise economic
and political barriers to their achievement. 37 Still,
the experiencesofthe U.S. and Japan have demon-
strated that financial reform develops its own
momentum since, by changing the financial envi-
ronment, it generates pressures for further change.
1\1.. Conclusion
Despite the similarity in timing, the process of
financial change in Japan and the U.S. displays as
many contrasts as similarities. Both countries have
witnessed substantial transformations in theirfinan-
cial systems over the last decade, mainly because
that period has brought especially great economic
changes. The contrasts lie in the nature of the
changes that have resulted and reflect the very great
differences between the traditional financial struc-
tures ofthe two countries.
On the whole, financial change in the U.S. has
been more narrowly focused than in Japan. Change
here has been spurred primarily by inflation, and it
has centered on deposit rate ceilings and limitations
on the competitive powers of depository institu-
tions. Reform in Japan has largely been a response
to fundamental changes in the requirements ofbusi-
ness, households, and government for a more flex-
ible and adaptable financial system. Reform in
Japan has thus been substantially more extensive
than that here even though its progress has been
uneven. Interest rate flexibility and the mobility of
international capital have increased substantially,
but household asset choices and conditions facing
private corporations in the capital markets have
changed much less.
Japan's financial system has changed more than
thatofthe U.S. largely because it was so much more
heavily regulated to begin with. Because ofits flex-
ibility, the U.S. system was able to accommodate
economic changes without substantial changes in
financial structure. Japan's more extensive regula-
tion also largely explains why its authorities have
been much more successful in controlling the pace
42
and directionofchange than theircounterparts here.
The U.S. and Japanese experiences with finan-
cial change suggest several lessons for policy-
makers in bothcountries. Theirexperiences demon-
strate that the greatest costs offinancial regulation
are not necessarily those distortions it imposes in a
static economic environment, but rather those it
leads to when economic conditions are changing
rapidly. In the U.S., for example, financial innova-
tions in response to economic changes have consid-
erably complicated the task of controlling, indeed
of interpreting, fluctuations in money growth.
These problems have come when money-control is
particularly critical for the economic well-being of
the nation. Japan's difficulties in adjusting to in-
creases in government debt, floating exchange
rates, and othereconomic changes have been great-
ly compounded by limitations on its financial sys-
tem resulting from past regulation. Thus, both
nations' experiences illustrate that delaying reform
until pressures for it becomes irresistible can often
entail considerable cost.
Japan and the U.S. have also shownthatfinancial
regulations and financial reforms are often highly
interrelated. Japanese authorities utilized capital
controls partly because oflimitations ofthe domes-
tic financial system. As liberalization ofthose capi-
tal controls has become necessary, reform of the
domestic system has become more urgent. Their
interdependence illustrates that financial reform can
lead to the unravelling of regulation. For this rea-
son, further liberalization in Japan's financial
system, and further change in our own, is very
likely.FOOTNOTES
1. Only in its limitations on branching by banks and thrifts
has the U.S. been markedly more restrictive than other
major industrial nations. Most other countries have con-
strained deposit interest rates to some degree, although
some have allowed these rates to vary more with market
yieldsthanhere. Manyothercountriesfollowourpracticeof
separating commercial and investment banking (Switzer-
land a major exception). However, generally the U.S. has
limited lending rates less extensivelythan mostotherdevel-
oped nations (exceptin consumer, and to a lesserextent in
mortgage finance). No country has limited international
capital flows, or the access of foreigners to the domestic
financial system, less.
2. See Prindl, pp. 3-8. Other excellent descriptions and
analyses of Japan's financial system include: Suzuki; Lay-
man; Wallich and Wallich; and the Bank of Japan's The
Japanese Financial System (1978). E. Sakakibara, R.
Feldman and Y. Harada ("The Japanese Financial System
in Comparative Perspective") provide a highly provocative
comparison of the U.S. and Japanese financial systems.
They pointoutthat competition among financial institutions
is fierce despite apparently stringent regulation. They also
argue that the high degree of financial intermediation fos-
tered by Japanese regulation had some significant social
benefits.
3. See Hayden, pp. 3-5 and Ackly and Ishi, pp. 159-160.
Anotherconsideration now a majorobstacleto interest rate
liberalization in the bond markets is the government's de-
sire to keep the cost of servicing its debt down. Of course,
whether controls have actually succeeded in promoting
business investment, much less increasing real growth,
can hardly be taken for granted, since generally any sub-
sidy to a sector must be paid for with a tax, implicit or
explicit, whose effects must be accountedforin judging the
total effectof the subsidy.
4. An excellentdiscussion of the evolution, and motivation,
of government controls on interest rates, is given in "Steps
Toward Flexible Interest Rates..." See also the discussion
in Layman and The Japanese Economic System. Suzuki
(Chapter Three) gives an illuminating explanation, and cri-
tique, ofthe 'logic' ofinterest rate controls in Japan.
5. The authorities have influenced rates in the bill market
through their purchases and sales; in addition call rates
were, until recently, set by a consultation process among
the dealers and government, which may have subjected
these rates to some 'moral suasion: See the Banking Sys-
tem in Japan (1981), pp. 97-98.
6. Corporate bond issues in Japan must be individually
approved by authorities (often a tedious process). Along
with limitations on issue yields and maturities, this practice
has, to say the least, discouraged this financial outlet. In-
deed, private corporate bonds (industrial bonds) have
tended to be purchased bythe principle banklenderstothe
issuer, making them effectively a loan in another guise.
Moreover, equity finance has been discouraged by the
Japanese practice (notapparentlygovernmentimposed) of
issuing new stock at par (primarily to existing holders);
Wallich andWallich (pp. 301-302)provide a plausible inter-
pretation ofthis practice. A description ofthe mechanics of
the bond markets can be found in The Japanese Financial
System, pp. 126-137.
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7. Indeed, lending by Japanese banks in the euromarkets
was virtually halted bythe authorities in 1976-1977, follow-
ing the Herstadt and Franklin-National debacles. See Q.
Lim, "The Year of the Samurai," Euromoney, February
1978.
8. In 1970, Japan openeda 'Samurai' marketfor yen bonds
issued by foreigners. Access has largely been confined to
international agencies, however.
9. Of course, the limitation of household financial outlets
may have helped channel savings to business. Note, how-
ever, that the ratio of residential investment to GNP in
Japan (6-7percent) hasgenerallybeen higherthan thatfor
the U.S. (4-5percent). Still, the shareoftotalsavingsgoing
to this outlet is considerably lowerin Japan than here.
10. For a more detailed discussion, see Pigott, 1978.
11. This is not to say that inflation has had no influence on
financial reform in Japan. Households appear to have be-
come more sensitive to yield differences on bank deposits
and postal-savings accounts as a result of the increase in
inflation, and marketyields, during 1973-1974. This has led
to an acceleration ofa longertrend underwhich theshareof
total household deposits held with the postal savings sys-
tem has increased. However, the 'disintermediation' prob-
lems ofJapanese banks have notbeen nearlyas severe as
those experienced by U.S. depository institutions, particu-
larly our thrifts. For a discussion, see "Trends in Personal
Savings...," Bank of Japan Research Department Special
Paper No. 98, April 1981.
12. The reasons cited hereforJapan's financial reformsare
very similar to those discussed in an excellent article on
"Financial Innovation and Monetary Indicatorsin Japan"by
Dorothy Christelow, in the Quarterly Review ofthe Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Spring 1981. See also, "Steps
Toward Flexible Interest Rates...," p. 3.
13. Generally, maturities have been limited to seven and
ten years, although beginning in 1977 the government be-
gan to issue shorter maturities in limited quantities. Of
course, the average maturityofoutstanding debt has been
declining overtime, with a considerable portion coming due
beginning in 1985; this situation is ofconsiderable concern
to the authorities.
14. For a description of this process, and its effects on the
private financial institutions, see the Mitsui Bank Monthly
Review, September 1982, and the Fuji Bank BUlletin, Oc-
tober 1980. A more general discussion ofthe burden ofthe
deficit and the debt is given in the Economic Survey of
Japan 1980/1981 by Japan's Economic Planning Agency.
For several years, until 1977, banks were forbidden to sell
off the government debt allocated to them, although in
practice the Bank ofJapan stood ready to purchase bonds
one year after their issue. Since 1977, banks have had
much greater freedom to sell their government debt to the
public, and in fact have generallysold overhalfthe amount
oftheir subscription.
15. This point is made, eloquently, in the London Economist
("But Mr. Suzuki, Your Big Budget Deficit is Far Too
Small"), October23, 1982.
16. Ofcourse government debt, is notthe only factor alter-
ing financial preferences in Japan. As financing patternshave changed, competitive relations and the desired char-
acteristics of assets and liabilities have been transformed
virtually everywhere. The impact on corporate finance is
discussed in "TheFinancing ofJapanese Industry," Bankof
EnglandQuarterfyReview, Vol. 21, No.4(December 1981),
pp. 510-518. In particular, as short-term interest rates have
come to vary more, corporations naturally have an incen-
tiveto increase longer-term financing to reduce cash-flow
variapilityfrom short-term interest rate fluctuations. Their
greater internal funds (relative to investment needs) prob-
ably has increased their need for liquid assets as outlets for
e~913ss cash .. .Relaxation of capital controls, by giving cor-
porationsandbanksgreateraccesstothefinancial facilities
available abroad, has had analogous effects. For a general
dis9ussion ofthese shifts, see the Fuji Bank Bulletin, Janu-
ary 1981, as well as Dorothy Christelow's article.
17. The need to liberalize financial markets to facilitate
private 'adjustment' is further discussed in Martin Gilman,
"Japan's Financial Coming of Age..:' and in "A Time for
Radical Change" in World Business Review, February
1981.. See also the discussions in Hayden and in Christelow.
i8. Indeed, liberalized capital flows potentiallycontribute to
exchange rate stability by insulating the market from tem-
porary fluctuations in demand and supply. For example, a
temporary trade deficit that led to exchange rate deprecia-
tion would spur an offsetting capital inflow, to take advan-
tage of the exchange appreciation likely when the imbal-
ance ends. This mechanism helps to insulate exchange
markets from factors perceived as transient, by linking the
actual exchange rate to its long-run value. However, if
liberalized capital flows are actually to reduce exchange
rate instability, two conditions must be met. First, the long-
run value of the exchange rate must be perceived as rea-
sonablystaPle; this means that government policies deter-
mining thisratemustbe credible and stable. Japan has met
this condition more than many countries, as it has been
comparatively successful in controlling a majordeterminant
of the y~n's ultimate value-its own inflation. At the same
time, though, c;lomestic financial markets must be reason-
aPly efficient. Otherwise, 'excessive' variations in interest
rates in 'thin' orotherwise limited domestic markets will be
transmitted to the exchange markets, possibly adding to
exchange rate volatility. This is one illustration of a more
general principle-that a need for financial liberalization in
one area spawns a need for liberalization in other markets.
That is, to have a properly functioning foreign exchange
market, Japan will ultimately have to have more efficient
domestic markets. For this reason, the shift to floating ex-
change rates should be a major spur to domestic financial
reform.
19. For a description of this system, see "Steps Toward
Flexible Interest Rates...," pp. 7-10.
20. Avery illuminating discussion of the impact of interest
rate liberalization in Japan is in "Japan: The Impact of
Interest Rate Liberalization," Asian Monetary Monitor,
November-December 1980. This discusses effects on in-
terest rate variability, relations among yields on similar in-
struments, and on bank earnings.
21. Thisdevelopmentis analyzed in moredetail in theAsian
Monetary Monitor piece: see Chart l.
22. In the U.S. for example, there is considerable evidence
suggesting that, prior to 1979, most variations in nominal
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ChapterThree.
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prior to the changes later in the decade (1973-1977, the
period when Japan's inflation waxed and waned), and be-
haviorresultingfrom the 1978-1979reforms (which should
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25. Except, perhaps, when monetary restraint has been
severe. The fact that real and nominal short-term rates in
Japan have been less variable than those in the U.S. over
1978-1981 is probably most a reflection of 'peculiar' condi-
tions here, that is the dramatic increase in interest rate
volatility afterthe October 1979 change in Federal Reserve
operating procedures.
2q. Prior to 1972, the call market provided limited facilities
for One and two-month financing. However, this function
was assumed by the bill market, and since 1972, the call
market mainly services very short-term needs (maturities
are generally 1-2day, and a maximum of one-week).
27. These ceilings, which are stated as fractions of bank
c<lpital,have been raised substantially since 1979, allowing
the marketto grow rapidly.
28. Fora detailed discussion ofthe new law, and theevents
leading to it, see M. Shimojo, 'The New Banking Law of
Japan: Securities Business by Banks," pp. 83-116; see
also Leon Hollerman, "Japan's New Banking Law" in the
January 1982 issue of The Banker. Both articles reveal the
ambigUities inthis law, illustrating that administrative 'inter-
pretation' in Japangenerallycan affectcriticallythe waylaw
is. applied. The.ultimate extent of banks powers in the
securities markets remains somewhat unclear.
29.<For a more detailed description of this innovation, and
the factors leading to it, see Dorothy Christelow's article.
30. See Shimojo, "The New Banking Law of Japan...," p.
101.
31. See "Features of Recent Corporate Financing," Bankof
JapanEconomic Research Department, Special PaperNo.
100, especially pp. 14-15. Admittedly, the authorities' will-
ingness to accommodate corporations increased need for
bond finance (at least to some degree) is 'liberalization,' at
least in the application of regulation. However, the large
government debt in the face of a limited market for long-
term·bonds almost certainly has been an impediment to
corporate efforts to reduce their dependence upon loans
from banks and otherfinancial institutions.
32.. Ofcourse, new-issueyieldson governmentdebtare set
belowthoseon tilesecondarymarketin large partto redl,lce
tile cost ofservicing this debt. Given this poliCY, it wOl,lld be
difficl,llt for the government to liberalize issl,le terms of cor-
Poratebondswithol,lt seriol,lsly l,lndercl,ltting the marketfor
its own secl,lrities.
33. Among the discriminatory steps were the excll,lsion of
foreign banksfrom theBankofJapan'sdiscountwindow, aswell as from participation in loan subsidies from the Japan
Development Bank and its Export-Import Bank. However,
foreign banks have also enjoyed certain advantages over
their domestic counterparts: in particular, they have not
been forced to take up government debt as have their
Japanese competitors.
34. For a more detailed analysis of. arbitrage between
Japan's money markets and those abroad, see Otani and
Tiware, "Capital Controls and Interest Rate Parity: The
Japanese Experience, 1979-1981," IMF Staff Papers,
1981.
35. The increase in these capital flows is much more dra-
matic in absolute (dollar) terms. Admittedly, the size of
these flows relative to exports, as shown in Chart 5, was
nearly as high in 1974....1975. However, then the authorities
administratively permitted such flows to aid in current ac-
countfinance; the scale of thesetransactions subsequently
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fell sharply. The present situation is fundamentally different
(unless the authorities reverse course by applying the 'es-
cape clause' extensively).
36. An excellent discussion of the forces spurring,
and those retarding, internationalization, can befound in
Hayden.
37. For example,.lifting restriction on. bank depositrates
nowcould further erodeearnings, which alreadY havebeen
depressedbytheirpurchases ofgovernmentdebt(notethe
similarity to the dilemma facing the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Committee here in the U.S.). Of course, re-
forms already in place create further pressures for change
as well. Forexample, debt-serviceofcorporations in Japan
is becoming more variable .and less. predictable as the
flexibility ofshort-term interest rates increases; as indicated
earlier, this gives them an incentive to exploit the long-term
capital markets to a greater degree than before.REFERENCES
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